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Before the Third Session of the Assembly, California Masonic Memorial  
Temple

"An Analysis of Communist Techniques for Conquest"

It is an honor to address the American Bar Association  
as I return to the practice of the law and to writing after a  
decade of government service.

I speak now as a private citizen. I have been away from  
my official duties sufficiently long to have no claim to any current  
inside information. In any event, nothing ages more quickly than a  
secret in the fast moving world of today.

It is hardly necessary to say to you that during my ten  
years of service with the Central Intelligence Agency the prime

intelligence task, day in day out, has been the analysis of the policies, tactics and the potential of the Soviet Union and Communist China.

Intelligence work seems to have a rather unique appeal for the lawyer. It was an eminent member of the bar and of this Association, William J. Donovan, popularly known as "Wild Bill", forceful head of the Office of Strategic Services during World War II, who enlisted me as one among a considerable group of lawyers, educators, and technician when he was building up his intelligence staff in the days following Pearl Harbor.

It was General Donovan who drew up the plans and who furnished much of the initiative that led to the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency under the National Security Act of 1947. This Act also created the Department of Defense, the National Security Council and other basic elements of our defense and security organization. It gave its sanction and authority to the coordinated

intelligence appraisal as a part of our national defensive shield in providing that the Central Intelligence Agency should "correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security" and see to its appropriate dissemination within the government.

An intelligence estimate has something in common with a legal brief. It takes a mosaic of facts, and what is believed to be fact, and draws conclusions. Unfortunately, in the case of the intelligence estimate there is no guiding law or precedent against which conclusions must be tested. The soundness of the estimate depends not alone upon the assembling and proper analysis of the facts. In many crucial cases, the estimator must gauge how the leaders of other nations will act or react in a given situation, what actions they will consider best suited under the circumstances to advance their national aims.

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Many fateful decisions in history have come from faulty deductions by persons in positions of high authority from the intelligence available, or by their failure to look facts in the face.

As we well know, the German Kaiser and his advisors in 1914 wrongly appraised the reaction of Great Britain to the violation of Belgian neutrality.

Hitler, fortunately for all of us, had a disdain for intelligence, except his own intuition.

At the time of Pearl Harbor, there was a failure to make adequate use of the intelligence available or to draw the proper conclusions from it. While this intelligence, as is so often the case, was not conclusive, it should have been sufficient to alert us.

The lessons of Pearl Harbor, plus the gathering menace of Communism, were the major influencing factors in our Government's decision to build up our own intelligence service. The purpose was to establish procedures which would clearly fix responsibility - first, for the prompt and coordinated analysis of vital information affecting our national security and second, for getting that analysis promptly to our chief policy and defense officers of government - the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chief of Staff. This action machinery, both human and mechanical, is now in place. In my opinion, it has been functioning well.

With these precautions taken, I believe that the failure, which occurred at the time of Pearl Harbor, to consider the vital intelligence, is not likely to occur.

But the intelligence process is by no means an exact science. Intelligence conclusions rarely can include a study of all the facts since they-all the facts- are seldom available. Furthermore,

some developments are so well concealed or so spontaneous that they escape any intelligence network.

This is well illustrated by an instance which involved somewhat different factors than the Pearl Harbor case. I refer to the advance of General MacArthur's forces to the Yalu River in October 1950, which led to Chinese Communist intervention in the Korean War. Even today there is a debate whether the available intelligence should have enabled us to forecast the Chinese attack.

Here was one of the classic situations which the intelligence officer faces so often. There was good intelligence as to the location and the strength of the hostile Communist forces to the North of the Yalu. What one did not know was the political decisions being made in Peiping and Moscow. How would they react to having American troops on the Yalu? We well knew the enemy's capabilities; we were uncertain as to his intentions.

as to his intentions.

The battle South of the Yalu had just been concluded when I started my C.I.A. work in Washington. I had returned to the practice of the law after my return in 1945 from intelligence work in World War II. I had every intention of sticking to the law. There had been a brief interruption in 1948 when President Truman had asked me to be chairman of a small committee of three, lawyers all, to advise him as to the appropriate organization of the C.I.A. under the legislation of 1947, which I have just mentioned.

We filed our recommendations and considered our obligations fulfilled. But General Bedell Smith, who had taken over the job of Director of the C.I.A. in 1950 thought differently. He wiped the dust from our report, which like so many such documents was peacefully aging in the files. He called two of the authors then available to come and advise him how the report could be put into effect. This

was to take only a few weeks he said. In my case the weeks became ten years. This shows the danger of trying to give advice to others. Writing such reports can be a perilous pastime.

During these ten years there have been great changes in the technique of intelligence collection. Classically, the intelligence product available to governments has been collected largely by the diplomat, the soldier, the intelligence officer and agent. In this last decade, science and technology have been increasingly useful in providing us new tools. For example, the air waves and air sampling bring us telltale evidence of nuclear tests. Advances in electronics, radar and photography have opened areas heretofore hidden behind a veil of secrecy.

These new means of intelligence collection are particularly important these days when our open society must compete against the closed society of the Communist states. Our own military defense preparations, our successes and our failures, are made in the glare

of publicity. The Soviets' and the Chinese Communist plans and military programs are prepared, their weapons tested, in secret. Sometimes, I am glad to say all this is not so hidden as they would wish, despite their walls and curtains and their vast security areas.

Today as the Free World proceeds to its analysis of what the Communist leaders are likely to do, we see that major changes in their tactics have occurred over the years.

It was originally the belief of Lenin, based on Marxism and his own experiences in the days of the Bolshevik revolution of October 1917, that other like revolutions would in due course sweep the rest of the world, that the battle cry in the Marxist Communist Manifesto - Working men of the world unite. The Proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains - would have automatic and wide acceptance. He also opined that the capitalist countries, without much help from outside, would be torn asunder by internal strife and

contradictions, or go down as a result of international wars. It looked at one time, long after Lenin had passed from the scene and as a second fratricidal struggle, World War II, shook the very foundations of the economic and cultural life of many countries of the Free World, that his prophecy might in fact come true.

But Lenin was mistaken. Stalin began to see this in the post-war days and decided that more vigorous action would be needed to help along the course of history as he saw it.

Although the USSR was then only beginning to develop its nuclear potential, Stalin in the post-war years took greater risks in the international field than ever before. He fomented revolutions in Europe and Asia, threatened Greece and Turkey, instituted the Berlin blockade and supported the Communist attack in South Korea.

There were dividends from these adventures. He consolidated Communist control of the satellites in Eastern Europe through the take-over of Czechoslovakia. There were unexpectedly large dividends in China. But Stalin overplayed his hand and there were debits too. The West and Japan rallied, the Marshall Plan and NATO played their parts, the Japanese treaty was concluded and the tide of Communism began to be contained.

On the internal scene, Stalin in his rise to power had left behind on the home front a legacy of terror.

As with most dictatorships, there is neither legal provision nor precedent to establish the successor.

The Party, of course, rules supreme and the Party has its hierarchy. In theory, power stems from the 8 million members of the Party and should be exercised through the Party Congress, of some 1,400 voting members, to the Central Committee of the Party - now some 200 strong - and to its Presidium, which today has 15 members.

As a practical matter, however, the pyramid of power is completely inverted. The power does not go from the people at the bottom to the top -- but from the dictator at the top down to the people. That is to say, the Presidium, then called Politburo and dominated by Stalin, today is dominated by Khrushchev, reached the decisions, which are rubber stamped, where appropriate, by the Central Committee and the Party Congress. In recent years available records fail to indicate that either in the Party Congress or in the Central Committee was any opposition allowed to be registered to the proposals of the dictator.

The reason is not far to seek. The dictator, as he climbs to the summit, takes over control of the Party and so adjusts the membership of the Presidium, of the Central Committee and of the Party Congress that they, each and all, do his bidding. It is as Head of Party and not as Head of the Government, that he rules.

One other vital element of power in the Soviet Union, in addition to the Party should be mentioned because the dictator must bring this also under his exclusive control. I refer to the state security service, which operates both domestically, to repress any opposition to the dictator within the country and internationally, to carry out the acts of violence and of espionage that are considered vital to the security of the state. In Lenin's time it was known as the CHEKA. Over the years, since Lenin's day, this service has gone through many transformations, and had many chiefs, the majority of whom were in turn liquidated, in part at least to help bury the record of their actions. During many of the years of Stalin's rule

it was known as the NKVD. Today, somewhat reorganized and for the time being at least de-emphasizing its terror role, it is known as the KGB.

One may well ask how it happened that in the middle of the 20th century Stalin could have banished from their homelands dissident and disaffected elements of the population, decimated the organs of the party and forcibly removed all his rivals. Winston Churchill reports that Stalin told him that in this process millions of people had died.

It was largely through the state security service working on the local scene with elements of the party that he was able to accomplish this. A score of times in his secret speech Khrushchev refers to the evil deeds of the NKVD. Khrushchev also details in the secret speech that as late as \_\_\_\_\_ Top of the Central Committee, which had been elected in 1934, were arrested and shot by Stalin's security service, and over 50% -- that is over 1,000, of the members of the Congress elected in that year -- had been arrested on charges

of anti-revolutionary crimes.

Here in the security service lies the major action instrument of the dictator of the Soviet Union as head of the party. To consolidate his position, it was therefore necessary that complete control of the security services should be centered in his hands.

In the case of Stalin, until the latter years of his life, in the international field, as distinct from his ruthlessness and brutality domestically, he had exercised his powers with great astuteness, with skill and with cunning.

A strange pall settled over his later years -- from about the middle of 1946 on. From that time until 1953, Stalin, according to the records, made no public statements. True, he appeared occasionally in public; occasionally, he gave out written treatises and answers to questions from the press, which could have been written by anybody; occasionally he received distinguished visitors. By and large during

these years till his death, he was a hermit concealed in the Kremlin and occasionally in his hideout in the Crimea. During this period, according to Khrushchev's own testimony, and I quote from his secret speech, Stalin "had completely lost consciousness of reality". This is only another way of stating that he was no longer rational. Many of his international acts during this period evidenced this. I refer particularly to the break with Yugoslavia in 1948. The recent testimony of the former Yugoslav leader, Djilas, bears this out. In the conclusions of his recently published book, based on conversations with Stalin, Djilas states,

"Every crime was possible to Stalin, for there was not one he had not committed. Whatever standards we use to take his measure, in any event - let us hope for all time to come - to him will fall the glory of being the greatest criminal in history. For in him was joined the criminal senselessness of a Caligula with the refinement of a Borgia and the brutality of a Tsar Ivan the Terrible."

"I was more interested, and am more interested, in how such a dark, cunning, and cruel individual could ever have led one of the greatest and most powerful states, not just for a day or a year, but for thirty years! Until precisely this is explained by Stalin's present critics - I mean his successors - they will only confirm that in good part they are only continuing his work and that they contain in their own make-up those same elements - the same ideas, patterns, and methods that propelled him."

It is fortunate for the world that Stalin during his lifetime did not himself dispose of any considerable nuclear stockpile. It is true that as early as 1949 the Soviet had detonated their first nuclear device. But even so he disposed of great conventional military might and the security of the world was in the hands of a man who, according to Communist admissions, was often irrational, uncontrolled and uncontrollable -- a product of the system that remains the system of the Soviet Union today though the power is being exercised more cautiously.

Too often we have rather casually accepted the somewhat legalistic conclusions that the form of government another state chooses to adopt or to tolerate is not a matter of international concern so long as the acts of that government do not directly impinge upon the rights and interests of other states. But such a philosophy contains in itself an inherent contradiction. If

an uncontrollable tyrant yields the power the very existence  
of that situation, one that prevailed in the Soviet Union during  
the Stalin era, might repeat itself and be a threat to the peace  
of the world, to the security of every other state and to the  
right and interests of all free peoples.

After Stalin disappeared from the scene in March 1953,  
there was a period of uncertainty before Khrushchev consolidated  
the power in his hands and was able to chart the new tactics to  
achieve Communist goals.

But within about 4 years of Stalin's death, Khrushchev  
had removed all serious contestants for the power by either name.  
Banishment to innocuous jobs far from Moscow - in the case of  
Malenkov, Molotov, Krugnovich and others of the so called anti-  
Party group. To accomplish this, Khrushchev in June of 1957,  
finally had to appeal to the Central Committee over an adverse  
majority in the Presidium. When the Central Committee, which then  
was his creature, ratified without question the dismissal of his

rivals and confirmed by its act Khrushchev's continuing control of the Security Service. All of them concurred in the Central Committee's denunciation of these actions except Molotov, who abstained.

There is good evidence that a major issue between Khrushchev and Molotov and his associates was that of one-man control of the State Security Service. Khrushchev's adversaries realized that if this remained in his hands alone their own days were numbered. They did not object to having a State Security Service or to its power which had been the backbone of Soviet rule from the days of Lenin. All they wanted was a voice in controlling it. When they lost this battle, Khrushchev, in addition to his position of Head of Party and of Government, remained in sole control of the Security Service. He is so today.

Meanwhile Khrushchev, even before he had eliminated all his chief rivals for power, had found it necessary to repudiate Stalin and Stalinism but not, of course, the basic objectives of Soviet policy.

It is clear from his famous speech, in 1956, the denigration of Stalin that Khrushchev and many of his colleagues were aghast at the record which Stalin had left behind him and particularly at his actions during his later abnormal days. This applied both to his internal policies in the suppression and liquidation of his own peoples and to his gambles in the foreign field.

Khrushchev also recognized that his goal - the victory of Communism - would take longer, and had to be approached somewhat differently, than his predecessors had estimated. Dangerous foreign adventures were to be avoided for the time being. The tactics of terror in the domestic field had to be abandoned.

Khrushchev, therefore, practised moderation at home and preached co-existence abroad. These policies he considered necessary until his objectives had been achieved in the economic field, namely, overtaking the United States in industrial production and power.

He has recently indicated this would take at least ten years and possibly another ten years till a truly Communist state could be achieved. While he disavowed any intention to extend Communism by direct use of armed force, he advocates the support of wars of liberation to gradually establish Communist forms of government in the broad reaches of the world. He preaches that just as capitalism had superseded the feudalism of old, so Communism would overtake and eliminate capitalism. He laid before the 22nd Party Congress of last year a picture of a Soviet state that in ten to twenty years would have such productive capacity

that it would set an example that other states would follow as a matter of course.

Some years ago, Rakosi, the dictator of Hungary, in telling how Communism had taken over that country, described their tactics as "salami tactics" -- the political sausage was cut up piece by piece. The pressure must be constant but not so dramatic as to invite forceful counter-measures and applied as targets of opportunity presented themselves, from Laos to Cuba.

Khrushchev claimed that his statement about burying us had been misinterpreted and misconstrued as a military burial. Be so, he said; he would not dig our graves and push us into them. He would sooner see to it that we did this for ourselves. He challenges us to prove which system, communism under dictatorship or the system  
<sup>free</sup>  
of/government and free enterprise, can produce the most for the peoples of the world.

Meanwhile, however, he has some burying to do himself.

He has been trying to disassociate himself from Stalin's acts, to bury and to make us forget the whole record of Stalinism - which I have described, almost 30 years of tumultuous dictatorship out of the four and a half decades of the existence of the Soviet regime.

He must try to bury the growing world appreciation that conditions of life in the Communist world, particularly in the Soviet Union and China, contrast sharply in favor of the Free World as against the Communist world.

He must try to bury the implications of the massive flight from Communism which has been taking place over the years from Eastern Germany, from Hungary and from Chinese Communism through Hong Kong and the fact that even the building of the Berlin wall and the strengthening of the iron and bamboo curtains have only

partially checked this flight.

He must try to bury or at least control the rising desires of the new generation in the Soviet Union, particularly in the student intellectual and managerial classes. They have had a glimpse of freedom; they want more. Furthermore, they are not satisfied about the explanation given of the years of Stalinism. The mere reburial of Stalin physically, renaming Stalingrad and rewriting their histories which give short shrift to Stalin's thirty years of rule puzzles them. Replacing the fulsome articles on Berlin in their encyclopedia by a turgid piece on the Bering Straits only tends to confuse the picture.

Khrushchev must try to bury the fact that the Marxist/Leninist call to the workers of the world to shake off their chains has been answered in this country, and many other countries of the Free World, by the free trade unions which have repudiated Communism and the system of forced labor existing in the Communist world. In the Soviet Union there are no free trade unions whatsoever.

He must try to bury the fact that Communism is running out of issues, that today, with a few exceptions, the only real colonialism that exists is in the Communist area of control — particularly in Hungary and Eastern Europe generally, that the capitalist world which Marx attacked is no longer the free enterprise world of today and that, with our higher living standards, there is far wider distribution of the wealth than in any Communist state. Furthermore, the imperialism that exists in the world today is Soviet imperialism.

He must obscure the fact that the system of free enterprise government as evidenced by the recovery in Europe and in parts of Asia is more vital today than ever before, that he can no longer count upon its collapse nor can he plausibly predict that the free world will fall apart, or tear itself to pieces by disunion or war as Lenin and Stalin had hoped.

He must accept the fact of the growing impossibility of preventing an ever broadening exchange of information and ideas between countries. Barriers and jamming are becoming increasingly futile. And today he has to worry about Telstar, which is something he will find it very difficult to bury, as from outer space it provides the means to transmit news on a world-wide basis.

And finally, he must recognize that his boast of the unity of the Communist world has been rudely shattered by the Sino-Soviet rift, by Communist Albania as it breaks away from Moscow, and <sup>by</sup> Yugoslavia, though Communist, prefers its independence.

To all these problems Khrushchev must add: the agricultural failures of the Communist world. Their whole system of collective and state farms has proved a disaster. Useful, maybe, as a means of imposing Communist political control on the rural population but expensive in manpower, meager in output.

The shortage of consumer goods.

The slow increase in the standard of living in the Communist world.

The plight of Communist China.

The problems of the Free World, serious as they are are dwarfed as compared with those of the Communist world.

True, we have plenty to do. There are serious issues in the slowly developing areas of Asia, Africa and in this hemisphere. And we cannot overlook the fact that in these countries the appeal of Communism is strong. There they do not know what is really going on in the Communist world or understand the purposes and objectives of Communism.

The appeal of Communism in these areas is due, in part, to the fact that it seems to offer an alternative to chaos, a refuge from the need to assume responsibility. The uninitiated put naive trust in

In the Communist slogan that the state will provide and while taking from the individual according to his ability will give according to the people's needs. Unfortunately, in the world there are more needy than there are able people; more consumers than the producers can satisfy.

We know that these Communist slogans are a mirage and a delusion. We believe in assuming individual responsibility and we repudiate the idea that the state should look after us and that we in return should give it the mandate to manage our lives and supply our needs.

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As you can see my years of study of Communism and all its works have not left me as a pessimist. In fact, in the last ten years more progress has been made than I would have expected in the dark days of Stalin.

The people of Russia, and I distinguish sharply between them and the Soviet regime, have consistently demonstrated, whenever they have had a free and safe opportunity to do so, their basic friendliness for the people of this country. As they learn more about us, there is a yearning on the part of many to find a way to gain for themselves some of the advantages, that we have. While the people of Russia have no direct power in government decisions there is building up reserve strength which probably no one realizes better than Khrushchev himself, and there are times when he apparently has taken account of this.

We cannot expect that Khrushchev will openly renounce his stated ambitions of Communism but we can approach the future with confidence if we of the Free World stay united and firm.

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In effect Khrushchev has challenged us to a contest to prove which of the two ways of life is superior. Let us accept that challenge forthrightly; let us prove the superiority of our way of life. Then under his own terms we, not he, will prevail.